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Abstract. We propose a framework for modelling situated resource-bounded
agents. The framework is based on an objective ascription of intentional modali-
ties and can be easily tailored to the system we want to model and the properties
we wish to specify. As an elaboration of the framework, we introduce a logic,
OBA, for describing the observations, beliefs, intentions and actions of simple
agents, and show that OBA is complete, decidable and has an efﬁcient model
checking procedure, allowing properties of agents speciﬁed in OBA to be veri-
ﬁed using standard theorem proving or model checking techniques.
1 Introduction
A major goal in intelligent agent researchis the formal modellingof agent-environment
systems. Such an account is key both in deepening our understanding of the notion of
agency,e.g.,therelationshipsbetweenagentarchitectures,environmentsandbehaviour,
and for the principled design of agent systems. A common approach is to model the
agentandits environmentinsome logicandprovetheoremsaboutthe agent’sbehaviour
in that logic. It is perhaps most natural to reason about the behaviour of the agent in an
epistemic logic; epistemic notionssuch as knowledgeand belief provide a compactand
powerful way of reasoning about the structure and behaviour of agents [13], and there
has been a considerable amount of work in this area, for example, [12,11,15,18,9,14,
21,20,22].
Much of this work has focused on postulating properties of agents in general, for
example the relationships between beliefs, desires and intentions investigated in [18].
While useful, such results can onlyprovideverygeneralguidanceto the agentdesigner,
since they abstract away from the speciﬁcs of particular agent-environment systems.
However, many interesting logical properties of agents depend on the agent’s architec-
ture and program and the environment in which it is embedded. In addition, from a
technical point of view, existing work often makes strong assumptions which can limit
its applicability when considering feasible (i.e., implementable) agent designs, e.g., the
assumption that agents are logically omniscient.
In this paper, we propose a logical framework for modelling agent-environment
systems. We adopt an explicitly design-oriented view in the sense that our framework
makes only minimal assumptionsaboutagents in general, and those assumptionswe do
make aremotivatedbyconsiderationof feasible agentdesigns.For example,we assumethat all feasibleagentswill havea ﬁnite state andwill requiretime toperforminferences
(i.e., they are not logically omniscient).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In sections 2 and 3 we present
our modelling framework and develop a model of a simple agent-environment system
within the framework. In section 4 we introduce a new logic based on these ideas,
OBA, which can be used to model a resource-bounded agent’s observations, beliefs,
goals and actions, and state some complexityresults for OBA. In section 5 we illustrate
our approach with a simple example based on the well known Tileworld domain and
show how OBA can be used to specify properties of the Tileworld agent. In section 6
we discuss related work, and in section 7 we conclude with some ideas for future work.
2 The Agent-Environment Model
Inthissectionwepresentalogicalframeworkformodellingagent-environmentsystems
based on state transition systems. We ﬁrst describe how to ascribe beliefs to agents on
the basis of the contents of their state and then outline how to specify properties of
agent-environmentsystems on the basis of transitions between states.
Thestate of an agent-environmentsystem, w, consists of two parts:the environment
state e(w) and the agent’s state s(w) 1. The environment state is a description of the
(physical or computational) environment “inhabited” by the agent. The agent’s state
contains all the internal representations which determine the behaviour of the agent.
We assume that some parts of the agent’s state can be interpreted as referring to (real or
hypothetical) objects or events in the environment, e.g., that there is an obstacle dead
ahead, or to properties of the agent itself, e.g., the level of the agent’s battery. Other
parts of the agent’s state are not objectively correlated with the outside world and are
needed only for the agent’s internalfunctioning,such as the agent’s goals, or thingslike
program countersand stack. The combined agent-environmentstates are assumed to be
ﬁnite and we assume that there are ﬁnitely many of them.
We describe the properties of the environment in a language built from a set of
propositional variables P. A ﬁnite subset of P, Pb = {(¬)p1,...,(¬)pm} corresponds
to thebeliefs ascribabletothe agent.We assumethat theagent’s state consists of ﬁnitely
many locations l1,...,ln, and that each location li can contain (exactly) one of ﬁnitely
many values, vi1,...,v ik. For example, we could have a location lt for the output of a
temperaturesensorwhichmaytakeanintegervaluebetween-50and50.Basedonthose
values, we can ascribe beliefs about the external world to the agent: for example, based
on lt = 20 we ascribe to the agent a belief that the outside temperature is 20 C. Each
proposition (¬)pi ∈P b corresponds to a set of values for a given location li (or set of
locations), but ‘translates’ this into a statement about the world. We assume a mapping
Bel assigning to each state s(w) of the agent a set of propositional variables and their
negations which form beliefs of the agent in state s(w). Note that this ‘translation’ is
ﬁxed and does not depend on the truth or falsity of the propositionsin the real world. In
general,thereis norequirementthatBel(s(w)) beconsistent;ifa propositionalvariable
and its negation are associated with two different locations (e.g., in an agent which
1 For simplicity, in this paper we consider only a single agent.has two temperature sensors) then the agent may simultaneously believe that p and ¬p.
Bel(s(w)) doesnothave to map a single value to a single belief,for example,all values
of lt > 20 could be mapped to a single belief that it’s “warm”. Conversely, we do not
assume that for every propositional variable p, either p or ¬p belong to Bel(s(w));i fa
location li has no value (e.g., if a sensor fails) or has a value that does not correspond
to any proposition, then the agent may have no beliefs about the outside world at all.
Other intentional notions such as goals can be modelled analogously to beliefs, i.e.,
by introducing an explicit translation from the contents of the agent’s state into the set
of goals. We may also ascribe arbitrary formulas to the agent as beliefs or goals, so
long as we do not ascribe to it any a priori ability to infer consequences or otherwise
manipulate those formulas.
Our aim is to model the transitions of the agent-environment system as a kind of
Kripke structure and express properties of the agent in some modal logic. The choice
of the set of transitions depends on the system we want to model and the properties we
wish to verify.
The most basic structure which we could consider is similar to, for example, the
interpreted systems of [9] except that the agent’s beliefs are modelled as a local prop-
erty of the agent’s state. To be more precise, the structure consists of a set of agent-
environment states W, each state w ∈ W has an agent part s(w) a n da ne n v i r o n m e n t
parte(w). Thestate oftheagents(w) comesequippedwith asetofformulasBel(s(w))
corresponding to agent’s beliefs; the state of the environment e(w) corresponds to a
classical possible world, or a complete truth assignment to propositional variables in
P. The agent believes that p in state w, w |= Bp,i fp ∈ Bel(s(w)). Note that this
truth deﬁnition for B does not give rise to any interesting logical properties of B,e . g .
to KD45 axioms. This is intentional: we do not want our agents to be logically omni-
scient and the logical properties of agent’s beliefs should be determined by the agent’s
architecture and program.
If we restrict ourselves to this basic set up, we can express some properties of the
agent in a suitable logic, such as CTL ([4]), and use a standard model checker such
as SMV to check whether the properties are true of the agent-environmentsystem. For
example, we may want to check whether the agent always has true beliefs about a
property p, i.e., whether AG(Bp → p). The set of states is generated by the agent’s
program together with appropriate environment responses. Note that the check for be-
liefs is done locally in state w and consists of checking whether a given formula is in
the set Bel(s(w)), so the problem can be easily solved by a standard model checking
techniques (e.g., with beliefs encoded as propositional variables).
However such an approach is too coarse grained even for analysing simple agents.
For example, if p is a property observable by the agent and observation of p is always
reliable, then the agentwill have true beliefs aboutp immediately after it has performed
an observation. However, this does not guarantee that the agent will always have true
beliefs about p in every state—if the agent doesn’t sense its environment continuously,
it may have false beliefs about p in some states, for example, in states resulting from
a change in the environment. We want to be able to express the fact that in all states
resulting from the agent performing an observation, Bp is true only if p is true. Themost natural way to express this is to label transitions of the system by ‘moves’ of the
agent and the environment.
In the remainder of this paper we work out this idea for a simple agent-environment
system in which the agent senses the environment, updates its state, and sends an ac-
tion to the environment, which in turn changes according to (one of the outcomes of)
the action. Note that we could have easily considered a different set of transitions, for
example, we could have introduced ﬁner grain in the agent’s state update transition to
model the agent’s deliberation more precisely.
3 A Simple Agent-Environment System
In what follows we view the agent and its environmentas a pair of interacting automata
(cf [19]) (see Figure 1). At each cycle, the environment generates an input or ‘percept’
to the agent followed by the agent generating an output or ‘action’ to the environment.
We assume that the environment “computes” its response to the agent’s action instan-
taneously and that the agent produces its response to the percept from the environment
in bounded time. We model perception and action as two non-deterministic transitions,
obs andact.Anobs transitiontakesthestate oftheenvironmentandupdatestheagent’s
state with a percept corresponding to the information returned by the agent’s sensors.
We assume that perception either returns accurate information about the environment
or one of ﬁnitely many outcomes of failed perception. The action transition act com-
putes the new state of the environment given the current state of the environment and
the action selected by the agent. An action either causes the environment to change in
the desired way (the action succeeds), or results in one of ﬁnitely many outcomes for a
failed action. If the response generated by the environmentdepends on both the agent’s
action and the amountof time it took the agentto produceit, this approximatesan asyn-
chronous interaction between the agent and a dynamic environment. Intuitively, if the
agent spends too much time selecting an action, then performing it does not produce
the expected result.
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Fig.1. Simple agent-environment systemThe agent consists of some state and an internal transition inf which models the
computationthe agent uses to updateits state (e.g. updateits beliefsand select an action
toperform).Itisassumedtodependontheagent’sperceptatthiscycleanditsstate from
the previous cycle and to terminate in bounded time.
As above, we describe the properties of the environment in a language built from
a set of propositional variables P. In addition to the mapping Bel introduced in the
previous section, we deﬁne a mapping Obs which takes the agent’s state s(w) and
returns a set of formulas, as a restriction of Belto the locations holding percepts. Since
observational beliefs are a subset of all beliefs, for every agent state s(w) we have
Obs(s(w)) ⊆ Bel(s(w)). Analogously we ascribe a set of goals Goal(s(w)) to the
agent based on designer-speciﬁed translation of the agent’s state.
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Fig.2. World Transitions (where O(s(w)) = Obs(s(w)) and ¯ O(s(w)) = Bel(s(w)) \
Obs(s(w)))
The combined agent-environment automaton cycles through the three transitions:
obs, inf and act (see Figure 2). At each cycle the environment updates the agent’s
state s(w) with its percept for this cycle. The agent then derives the consequencesof its
new beliefs (if any) and performs an action on the basis of this new state. The agent’s
observational beliefs, Obs(s(w)), only change after the obs transition and the rest of
the agent’s beliefs and goals only change after the inf transition. We assume that inf
does notchangethe agent’s observationalbeliefs Obs(s(w)), as these correspondto theagent’s “sensor readings”, and, as such, should not be ‘overwritten’ by inference.2 We
further assume that the environment does not change while the agent executes its pro-
gram, so e(w) only changes after the act transition (which doesn’t change the agent’s
state).
Introducing three separate transitions rather than collapsing them into one single
step (corresponding to a full obs, inf and act cycle) allows more precise modelling
of changes in the agent’s beliefs and intentions. We want to be able to talk about the
state of the agent after it has performed the observation but before it completed all the
planning necessary to choose an action, or after it has selected the action but before it
has performed it. This is essential in analysing a resource-bounded agent which may
be capable of selecting the “right” action to perform but is unable to do so before the
environmentchanges so as to invalidate the action’s preconditions.
4 A Logic for Agent-Environment Systems
Inthissection,wegiveaformaldeﬁnitionofthetransitiongraphsoftheagent-environment
system described in the previous section, and a logical language to reason about the
agent’s observations, beliefs and goals.
We describe transition graphs in a logic which we call OBA (for ‘Observation,
Belief and Action’). OBA includes PDL (Propositional Dynamic Logic, see [17]) with
three atomic transition labels o, i and a corresponding to obs, inf and act,a n di n
addition contains observation, belief and goal operators. We deﬁne a transition term
x as o|i|a|x;y|x∗,w h e r ei fx and y are transition terms then x;y is their sequential
composition (transition x followed by y)a n dx∗ stands for 0 or ﬁnitely many iterations
of x.
In addition to the set of propositional variables P and boolean connectives, the
language of OBA contains:
– for each transition term x, a unary modality  x .  x φ,w h e r eφ is any formula,
stands for ‘from here we can make an x transition after which φ holds’. A dual
modality [x]φ is deﬁned as ¬ x ¬φ and stands for ‘after all x transitions we can
make from here, φ holds’.
– unarymodalities O, O  and G, which can onlybe appliedto propositionalvariables
or their negations. Oφ stands for ‘the agent observes that φ’, O φ stands for ‘the
agent has a non-observational belief φ’, and Gφ stands for ‘the agent intends that
φ’ (in all three cases, φ is a propositional variable or its negation).
The belief modality B is deﬁned as follows: Bφ =df Oφ ∨ O (φ).
In the models below we only allow legal states of the system as possible worlds,
i.e., states which are possible given the characteristics of environment and the agent’s
program.
Deﬁnition 1. AnOBAmodelM isatuple W,V,Obs,Bel,Goal,obs,inf ,act where
2 This limitation is not overly restrictive: the obs transition is non-deterministic (perception is
not guaranteed to veridical) and the agent may still derive incorrect beliefs about the world on
the basis of its percepts.W is a set of worlds. Each world w is a pair (s(w),e(w)) where s(w) is the state of
the agent and e(w) the state of the environment.
Bel(s(w)) is the ﬁnite set of beliefs (elements of P or their negations)associated with
s(w);
Obs(s(w)) ⊆ Bel(s(w)) is the set of observational beliefs;
Goal(s(w)) is the ﬁnite set of goals(elementsof P or their negations)associated with
s(w);
V assigns true or false to pairs (e(w),p) where e(w) is a state of the environment and
p ∈P.
obs, inf , act are binary relations on W. To say that a world v is reachable from a
world w by an atomic transition x (e.g. obs) we will use notation w
x −→ v (e.g.
w
obs −→ v).
The following restrictions on obs, inf and act hold:
Availability For every w, exactly one of the following is true: ∃v(w
obs −→ v), ∃v(w
inf
−→
v), ∃v(w
act −→ v)
Order On all paths in the transition system, atomic transitions succeed each other in
the order obs;inf ;act.
Change(obs) Ifw
obs −→ w  thenGoal(s(w)) = Goal(s(w )),Bel(s(w))\Obs(s(w)) =
Bel(s(w ))\Obs(s(w )) ande(w)=e(w ). (Observationmaychangethe percepts
Obs(s(w)) but not the environment, non-observable beliefs or goals. Note that we
are assuming that the same literal cannot be both an observational and a non-
observational belief.)
Change(inf ) If w
inf
−→ w  then Obs(s(w)) = Obs(s(w )) and e(w)=e(w ). (Infer-
ence does not change the environment or percepts.)
Change(act) If w
act −→ w  then s(w)) = s(w ). (The agent’s state does not change as
a consequence of action.)
Af o r m u l aφ is true at a world w in M (M,w |= φ)i f
M,w |= p iff V (e(w),p)=true;
M,w |= ¬ψ iff M,w  |= ψ
M,w |= ψ ∧ χ iff M,w |= ψ and M,w |= χ
M,w |=  o ψ iff there exists a world w  such that w
obs −→ w  and M,w  |= ψ.
M,w |=  i ψ iff there exists a world w  such that w
inf
−→ w  and M,w  |= ψ.
M,w |=  a ψ iff there exists a world w  such that w
act −→ w  and M,w  |= ψ.
M,w |=  x;y ψ iff there exists a world w  which is reachable from w by a transition
x followed by a transition y and M,w  |= ψ.
M,w |=  x∗ ψ iff there exists a world w  such that either w = w  or there exists a
path consisting of x transitions from w to w , and M,w  |= ψ.
M,w |= Oψ iff ψ ∈ Obs(s(w));
M,w |= O ψ iff ψ ∈ Bel(s(w)) \ Obs(s(w));
M,w |= Gψ iff ψ ∈ Goal(s(w));
Af o r m u l aφ is OBA-satisﬁable if there is a OBA model M and a world w in M such
that M,w |= φ. A formula φ is OBA-valid (|=OBA φ) if its negation is not satisﬁable.Theorem 1. The axiom system below is weakly complete and sound for OBA, that is,
for every formula φ,
 OBA φ iﬀ |=OBA φ.
 OBA φ stands for φ is either one of the axioms below or is obtained from axioms by
application of inference rules given below:
Classical propositional logic:
CL Axioms of classical propositional logic;
MP   φ, φ → ψ =⇒  ψ
Observational and non-observationalbeliefs are disjoint:
O ¬(Oφ ∧ O φ)
Normal modal logic axioms for [x],w h e r ex is any transition
K [x](φ → ψ) → ([x]φ → [x]ψ)
N   φ =⇒  [x]φ
Axioms for composition and iterations
C [x;y]φ ↔ [x][y]φ
It1  x∗ φ ↔ (φ ∨  x  x∗ φ)
It2 [x∗](φ → [x]φ) → (φ → [x∗]φ)
Availability and order of transitions
T1 ( o  ∧¬ i  ∧¬ a  )∨( i  ∧¬ o  ∧¬ a  )∨( a  ∧¬ i  ∧¬ o  )
T2 [o] i   ∧ [i] a   ∧ [a] o  
Changes after transitions
C(obs) φ → [o]φ,w h e r eφ does not contain subformulas of the form Oψ
C(inf ) φ → [i]φ,w h e r eφ does not contain subformulas of the form O ψ or Gψ
C(act) Xφ→ [a]Xφ,w h e r eX ∈{ O,O ,G}.
Note that there are no axioms connectingbeliefs and goals, in particular no require-
ment that the agent does not intend what it already believes (cf [18]). We will see in the
next section that it is possible for a resource bounded agent to both believe and intend
φ, e.g., while it is updating its goals.
Proof. To provesoundness,we needto showthatallaxiomsarevalidandrulespreserve
validity. The argumentfor standard axioms and rules such as CL, MP, K, N, C, It1, It2
is omitted. The axiom O is valid because no belief φ can belongboth to O(s(w)) and to
B(s(w))\Obs(s(w)).T h ea x i o mT1 is validbecausefromeverystate w, exactlyoneof
the three transitions is possible. The axiom T2 is valid because if it is possible to make
an x transition from w then from the resulting state it is possible to make a y transition,
provided (x,y) ∈{ (o,i),(i,a),(a,o)}. Validity of C(obs) follows from Change(obs).
We can show by induction on subformulas χ of φ built from propositional variables
and subformulas of the form O ψ and Gψ that M,w |= χ iff M,w  |= χ where w  is
accessible from w by obs. Analogously for C(inf ) and C(act).
Now we prove completeness. Let φ be an OBA-consistent formula. We will con-
struct a ﬁnite satisfying model for φ in a standard way (see for example [3]). Let Cl(φ)
be the Fisher-Ladnerclosure of the set of subformulasof φ togetherwith three formulas
 o  ,  i   and  a  . The satisfying model for φ, Mphi,i sd e ﬁ n e da sf o l l o w s :
The set of worlds Wφ is the set of all maximal consistent subsets of Cl(φ)Vφ(e(w),p)=true iff p ∈ w
Obsφ(s(w)) = {ψ : Oψ ∈ w}
Belφ(s(w)) = Obsφ(s(w)) ∪{ ψ : O ψ ∈ w}
Goalφ(s(w)) = {ψ : Gψ ∈ w}
w
obs −→ v in Mφ iff the conjunction of formulas in w, which we denote by ˆ w,i s
consistent with  o ˆ v, similarly for inf and act.
For every regular expression π composed from obs,inf and act using sequential com-
positionandﬁniteiteration,wedeﬁnethecorrespondingaccessibilityrelationasSπ(w,v)
iff the formula ˆ w∧ π ˆ v is OBA-consistent.The proofthatrelationsdeﬁnedthis way do
indeedcorrespondtosequentialcompositionandﬁniteiteration,aswell astheexistence
lemma and the truth lemma, are standard. Note that the restriction on the language en-
sures that Belφ(s(w)) and Goalφ(s(w)) only contain propositional variables and their
negations.TheonlyslightlytrickyclauseinthetruthlemmaisshowingthatO ψ ∈ w iff
ψ ∈ Belφ(s(w))\Obsφ(s(w)).L e tO ψ ∈ w.T h e nψ ∈ Belφ(s(w)) by the deﬁnition
of Belφ(s(w)). By axiomO, ψ  ∈ Obsφ(s(w)). Hence,ψ ∈ Belφ(s(w))\Obsφ(s(w)).
The other direction: suppose ψ ∈ Belφ(s(w)) \ Obsφ(s(w)).T h e nψ  ∈ Obsφ(s(w)).
However, ψ is in Belφ(s(w)) hence O ψ ∈ w by the deﬁnition of Belφ(s(w)).
We need to show that the special conditions on the OBA models hold: namely, that
the transitions follow each other in the right way, and change the world in the way
constrained by Availability, Order, Change(obs), Change(inf ) and Change(act).
Let us ﬁrst show that in each world, exactly one of the transitions obs,inf ,act is
possible. Note that the conjunction of formulas in each world is consistent with exactly
one of  o  ,  i   and  a   (because the world is maximally consistent with respect to
T1 and contains some  x  ). This means that ˆ w ∧  x   for some x is consistent, and
  can be expanded into a maximally consistent conjunction of formulas ˆ v from Cl(φ)
by forcing choices; this gives us a world v accessible by x from w. For all other atomic
transitions y, there is no such world v, because if ˆ w∧ y ˆ v is consistent, then ˆ w∧ y  
is, and w inconsistent with T1.
Next, let us show that the Order property holds. Just as an example, we show that
obs cannot be followed by act: proofs for the other conditions are similar. Suppose
some ˆ w is consistent with  o ˆ v and ˆ v is consistent with  a ˆ u. Note that in this case ˆ v
contains  a  . So it follows that  o  a   is consistent, but this contradicts T2.
Finally, let us show that Change(obs) holds (other conditions are analogous). We
need to show that whenever ˆ w ∧  o ˆ v is consistent, the state of the environment is the
same in w and v, that is for every propositional variable p, p ∈ w iff p ∈ v. Suppose
p ∈ w but p  ∈ v. Then it follows that p ∧  o ¬p is consistent, but it contradicts C(obs).
Similarly for the case p  ∈ w but p ∈ v. Non-observational beliefs are the same in w
and v,t h a ti sBelφ(s(w))\Obsφ(s(w)) = Belφ(s(v))\Obsφ(s(v)): this follows from
O ψ ∈ w iff O ψ ∈ v,b yC(obs). Similarly for the set of goals in w and v.
Theorem 2. The satisﬁability problem for OBA is decidable.
Proof. Decidability follows from the bounded model property for OBA which can be
established as a by-product of Theorem 1: every satisﬁable formula φ has a model of
size at most 2|φ|. This gives the following NEXPTIME decision procedure: guess a
model of size 2|φ| and check whether φ is true there.In fact, the complexity of the decision procedure can be improved to EXPTIME analo-
gously to PDL (see [3]).
Theorem 3. Given a formula φ and a model, state pair M,w there is an O(|M|×|φ|)
algorithm for checking whether M,w |=OBA φ.
Proof. This follows from the result on complexity for model checking for PDL ([8]).
In addition to PDL modalities we have modal operators O, O  and G in the language,
but checking whether Oψ, O ψ or Gψ is true in a world w can be done in constant time
(subformulas of the form Oψ, O ψ and Gψ can be treated as propositional variables).
In OBA, we can express properties of a particular agent design and verify whether
theyhold asexpected.Thereare two possible waysof doingthis. We can axiomatisethe
agent’s program and the interaction between the agent and its environment, and prove
that the property follows from those extra axioms and the OBA axioms. Alternatively,
given the agent’s program and all possible environment’s responses to the agent’s ac-
tions, we can generate the state transition graph and check whether the property is true
in all states in the graph. Both approaches are feasible given the decidability and low
cost of model checking of OBA.
5 An example: the Tileworld
In this section we illustrate our approach with an example based on the well-known
Tileworld domain [16]. For reasons of brevity, our Tileworld is very simple. The en-
vironment consists of an unbounded rectangular grid. Each square in the grid contains
either a tile or a hole or is empty, and tiles and holes are distributed randomly through-
out the grid.3 The environmentcontainsa single agent which can move forwardon rails
laid over the squares and has a sensor which allows it to see whether the square directly
underneath it contains a tile or a hole or is empty. If it sees a tile it can pick it up and
carry it. If it is holding a tile and is located above a hole it can drop it in the hole. Holes
are one tile deep and dropping a tile into a hole turns the hole into an empty square.
For simplicity we have assumed that the agent’s sensors are veridical in the sense that
they either return correct information about the environment or an ‘undeﬁned’ value
indicating the sensor returned no data at this cycle. We also assume that the actions of
picking up or dropping a tile can fail, leaving the world unchanged; moving forward
always succeeds and leaves the agent above the next square. We stress that these as-
sumptionsare not essential, and OBA can be used to reason aboutmore realistic agents
with unreliable perception and more complex actions failures.
The goal of the agent is put a tile in a hole. Informally,the programof the Tileworld
agent consists of the following simple rules:
– if holding a tile and above a hole, repeatedly try to drop the tile until the tile is in
the hole;
3 Unlike the original Tileworld [16], there are no obstacles and tiles and holes do not appear and
disappear randomly, i.e., the environment is static.– if not holding a tile and above a tile, repeatedly try to pick it up until the square
below the agent is empty;
– otherwise, move forward.
The agent’s state consists of four locations, p, g, h,a n da:
p is for storing percepts, and can take one of four values: 0 for the agent is abovea tile,
1 for the agent is above a hole, 2 for the agent is above an empty square and 3 for
‘undeﬁned’.
h is for storing information about whether the agent is holding a tile: 1 for the agent is
holding a tile, and 0 for the agent is not holding a tile.
g is for storing goals, and can take one of four values: 0 for looking for a tile, 1 for
picking up a tile, 2 for looking for a hole, and 3 for dropping a tile.
a is for storing selected actions, and can also take one of four values: 0 for pick up
the tile beneath the agent, 1 for drop the tile the agent is holding, 2 for move for-
ward one grid cell, and 3 for a special ‘no-op’ action which does not change the
environment.
The execution cycle of the agent then becomes:
obs : sensing the environment to ﬁnd out what is underneath the agent and updating
the p location;
inf : updating the values of h, g and a according to the agent’s program; and
act : sending the value in a to the environment.
To ascribe beliefs and intentions to the Tileworld agent, we do not need a distinct
propositional variable for every combination of location and value. The set PTL =
{p0,p 1,p 2,h,a 0,a 1,a 2,a 3} is sufﬁcient to capture those beliefs and goals which are
relevanttothe choiceofthe agent’sactions. Dueto lackof spacewe do notspecifyObs,
Bel and Goal completely, but illustrate them via examples. Let p0 mean ‘the agent is
above a tile’.
p0 ∈ Obs(s(w)) iff in s(w), p = 0 (the agent observes that it is above a tile); similarly
for p1 and p2.
¬p0 ∈ Obs(s(w)) iff in s(w), p =1o rp = 2 (the agent observes that it is not above a
tile); similarly for ¬p1 and ¬p2.
p0 ∈ Goal(s(w)) iff in s(w), g = 0 (the agent intends to be above a tile); similarly for
p1 and g =2 .
Note that it is possible for example for neither p0 nor ¬p0 to be in Obs(s(w)) if the
agent’s sensors have failed (p =3 ) .
The agent’s program is given by a series of rules which map from agent states to
agent states. For example, the rule:
p =1 ,h =1 ,g =2 ,a  =0= ⇒ p =1 ,h =1 ,g =3 ,a =1
states that if the agent believes that it is above a hole, is holding a tile, and has a goal of
looking for a hole, then the agent should drop the tile. Other rules detect the effects of
successfulactions,failedactionsandsensorfailures.Forexample,if theagentperceivesan empty square after attempting to drop a tile, it updates its beliefs to record the fact
that it is no longer holding a tile, and its goals to “looking for a tile”, and selects a
“moveforward” action. If the agent perceives a hole after attempting to drop a tile, (i.e.,
the drop action failed and the agent is still holding the tile), then it does not update its
beliefs and goals and repeatsthe drop action. If the agent’s sensors return no data at this
cycle, its beliefs and goals do not change and it selects the no-op action and so on.
OBA can be used to specify properties of the Tileworld agent that a designer may
want to verify. For example, we can state that the agent will achieve a particular goal,
e.g., ﬁnding a tile: [(a;o;i)∗](Gp0 →  (a;o;i)∗ p0) (‘if the agent intends to be above
a tile then after ﬁnitely many cycles it will be above a tile’). This statement holds in
all states provided the sensors are veridical, sensor failures only last for ﬁnitely many
cycles and it is always possible to reach a tile after ﬁnitely many moves forward. The
veridicality of sensors can be expressed as [o](Oφ → φ) (note that Oφ → φ is only
guaranteed to hold after an obs transition). Another important property is commit-
ment to goals: if the agent has a goal φ, it will not give it up until φ becomes true:
[(a;o;i)∗](Gφ → [a;o;i](φ ∨ Gφ)). As we mentioned in the previous section, it is
possible for the agent both to believe and intend the same formula: for example, if the
agent’s goal is to be above a tile and it has performed a move forward action which
brought it above a tile, then after a successful obs transition it will believe that it is
above a tile (Op0 hence Bp0)4, but still have the goal of being above the tile (the goals
will be updated after the inf transition); hence Bφ →¬ Gφ is not valid.
6 Related Work
Ourapproachhas somesimilarities with thesituatedautomataworkofRosenscheinand
Kaelbling [19]. Rosenschein and Kaelbling model an agent using two functions, a state
updatefunction,f, which mapsthe input(percepts)and the valueof the agent’sinternal
state at the last cycle into a new value of the internal state, and an output function, g,
that maps the input and the value of the agent’s internal state at the last cycle into the
output (actions). They ascribe belief (or rather knowledge) to the agent by associating
with every combination of location/value pair (l,v) the most informative proposition φ
such that in all runs of the system when l = v in the agent’s state, φ holds. This forces
the agent to have true beliefs and its beliefs are closed under logical consequence. The
resulting notion correspondsto implicit knowledgeas deﬁned in [9], or the information
implicitly encoded in the state, and satisﬁes the properties of an S5 modality. van der
Hoek, Linder and Meyer in [21] formalise all relevant aspects of the agent’s architec-
ture and use PDL to reasonabout state transitionsas we do. Howeverthey model agents
as logically omniscient, consider only deterministic actions, and model knowledge and
beliefs using an additional Kripke structure associated with every global state. In con-
trast, our approach combines the modelling of belief change and action performance in
a single structure and is much simpler, giving an efﬁcient model-checking procedure.
A compact modular representation of agent-environmentsystems has been recently
given in [10]; perhaps our logic can be interpreted on such systems rather than on a
combined transition graphs in the future, especially for the multiagent case.
4 Recall that Bφ =df Oφ ∨ O
φ.Step logic [7] provides a mechanism for reasoning about non-omniscient time-
bounded reasoners; agent’s beliefs are indexed by time points or steps, corresponding
to stages in the agent’s reasoning. Other recent approaches that avoid the problem of
logical omniscience and model agent’s beliefs as syntactic objects are Duc’s dynamic
epistemic logic [5,6] and ˚ Agotnes’s logic of ﬁnite syntactic epistemic states [1].
In other work, we have applied a syntactic approach to modelling agent’s beliefs to
verifying properties of an agent implemented in a simpliﬁed version of the 3APL agent
programming language [2]. However, in that work we made a simplifying assumption
thattheagent’sbeliefsareveridicalandactionssuccessful,toavoidexplicitlymodelling
the agent’s environment. The current paper provides a way to overcome this limitation.
7 Summary and Future Work
In this paper,we proposea new approachto the formal modellingof agent-environment
systems which focuseson particular agent designs. Propertiesof the agent-environment
system depend on the agent’s architecture and programand the characteristics of its en-
vironment rather than on a priori assumptions about agents in general, e.g., that agents
are rational or logically omniscient. We show how to ascribe beliefs and other inten-
tional modalities based on designer-stipulated correlations between the values of lo-
cations in the state of the agent and the state of the environment, and how to model
operations within the agent and interactions between agent and environment as state
transitions. Our approach to belief ascription is local in the sense that belief is not de-
ﬁned in terms of all possible runs of the agent-environmentsystem (cf. [9]) and the set
of transitionscan be tailored to the system we wantto modeland the propertieswe wish
to specify.
Drawing on these ideas, we deﬁne a new logic, OBA, which can be used to model
a resource bounded agent’s observation, beliefs, goals and actions. We prove complete-
ness and decidability results for OBA and show that it has a reasonablemodelchecking
procedure(O(|M|×|φ|),w h e r e|M| is the size of the model and |φ| the size of the for-
mula). OBA allows for both failed perceptionand failed actions, and the agent’s beliefs
are not required to be consistent or closed under logical consequence. We explicitly
introduce the cycle of the agent in the logic and analyse the agent’s beliefs at every
point in the cycle, allowing us to distinguish the agent’s beliefs, e.g., after a percept is
receivedbut beforethe rest of the state is updated.As an illustration, we modela simple
Tileworld agent and express some properties of the resulting agent-environmentsystem
in OBA. Such properties can be efﬁciently checked using standard model checking or
theorem proving techniques.
In future work we plan to develop the framework outlined above to analyse more
complicated agent behaviours, for example, to model trial and error attempts to achieve
a goal, or characterise robust behaviours.
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